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In "Professor Mackie And The Kalām Cosmological Argument" (Religious 
Studies, 1984, Vol.20, pp.367-375), Professor William Lane Craig 
undertakes to demonstrate that J. L. Mackie's analysis of the Kalām 
cosmological argument in The Miracle Of Theism (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1982) is "superficial", and that Mackie "has failed to 
provide any compelling or even intuitively appealing objection against 
the argument". (p.367) I disagree with Craig's judgement; for it seems 
to me that the considerations which Mackie advances do serve to refute 
the Kalām cosmological argument. Consequently, the purpose of this 
paper is to reply to Craig's criticisms on Mackie's behalf. 
 
This paper has three parts. In the first part, I outline the Kalām 
argument, and introduce the objections which Mackie makes to it. In 
the second part, I present the replies which Craig makes to Mackie's 
objections. Finally, in the third part, I explain why I think that 






In outline, the Kalām argument runs as follows: 
 
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence. 
2. The universe began to exist. 
3. (Hence) The universe has a cause of its existence. 
 
Since this argument is obviously valid, the only question is whether 
the two premises are true. (Whether this argument would then establish 
that God exists is of course a further question. However, I shall 
postpone this consideration until some other occasion.) I shall begin 
by considering the second premise. 
 
There are two sub-arguments which proponents of the Kalām cosmological 
argument have given in defence of 2. These sub-arguments may be 
schematised as follows: 
 
2.10 If the universe did not begin to exist, then an infinite temporal 
regress of events exists. 
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist. 
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite. 
2.13 (Hence) An infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist. 
(From 2.11, 2.12.) 
2 (Hence) The universe began to exist. (From 2.10, 2.13.) 
 
2.20 If the universe did not begin to exist, then the temporal series 
of past events is actually infinite. 
2.21 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually 
infinite. 
2.22 The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by 
successive addition. 
2.23 (Hence) The temporal series of past events cannot be actually 
infinite. (From 2.21, 2.22) 
2.24 (Hence) The temporal series of past events is not actually 
infinite. (From 2.23) 
2. (Hence) The universe began to exist. (From 2.20, 2.24) 
 
Since both of these sub-arguments are clearly valid, the question of 
the truth of 2. would be decided affirmatively by the truth of either 
2.10-2.12 or 2.20-2.22. On the other hand, if it could be shown that 
one of 2.10-2.12 and one of 2.20-2.22 is false, then it would follow 
that proponents of the Kalām argument have not succeeded in showing 
that 2. is true. Of course, this would not show that the initial 
argument is unsound -- but it would show that we haven't yet been 
given any good reason to believe its conclusion. 
 
There may be arguments which can be given in defence of 1. However, in 
this initial presentation of the argument, I shall suppose that 
proponents of the Kalām argument are content to rest their case for 1. 
in intuition. 
 
Not surprisingly, Mackie contends that neither of the sub-arguments 
can be shown to be sound. Furthermore, he contends that there is no 
good reason to suppose that 1. is true. And, finally, he contends 
that, even if the above objections fail, there are reasons for 
supposing that the theist cannot consistently hold that God can exist 
uncaused and yet the universe cannot exist uncaused. 
 
Against the first sub-argument, Mackie objects that 2.11 is not 
supported by the considerations which are normally advanced to 
underwrite it. For, once one has grasped the principles of infinite 
set theory, one can see that there are no real contradictions involved 
in the notion of an actual infinite. Consequently, we need to be given 
some further reason to suppose that 2.11 is true. But no further 
reasons seem to be forthcoming. 
 
Against the second sub-argument, Mackie objects that 2.21 just 
expresses a prejudice against actual infinities. As Craig notes, the 
traditional (medieval) version of the argument which is most often 
given in support of 2.2 may be schematised thus: 
 
2.221 An infinite distance cannot be crossed. 
2.222 (Hence) If the past were infinite, then today would never 
arrive. 
2.223 (But) today has arrived. 
2.224 (Hence) The past must be finite. 
 
But Mackie's objection is that 2.221 simply begs the question. What 
reason is there to suppose that an infinite distance cannot be 
crossed? 
 
Against 1., Mackie objects that it is surely conceivable that things 
might exist uncaused. Given this prima facie case against 1., the 
defender of the argument needs to provide some countervailing 
argument. But none seems to be forthcoming.  
 
Moreover, Mackie suggests that the assumptions which are required for 
the argument may be inconsistent with other assumptions which the 
theist is required to make. The difficulty is that the intuitions 
which are used to support 1. and 2. may well be unavailable to the 
theist: for there is a question about the nature of God's existence 
which the theist needs to face. If the theist supposes that God began 
to exist at a certain point in time, then the theist is not entitled 
to suppose that 1. is true. But if the theist supposes that God's 
existence has no beginning in time, then it seems that the theist must 
suppose that God has existed for an infinite amount of time -- and so 
the theist is not entitled to the assumptions which are used to 
support 2. 
 
Finally, Mackie objects that even if the theist claims that 2. is 
supported by the empirical evidence (of the big bang) -- and hence is 
not in need of philosophical support -- there is still a question 
about the explanation of the existence of God which needs to be 
addressed. Presumably the theist will say that God's existence and 
power are "self-explanatory"; but it is hard to see how we can make 







In response to Mackie's objection to the first sub-argument, Craig 
objects that Mackie has done nothing to justify the assumption that 
the conditions which give rise to the existence of an actual infinite 
may hold in the real world. "[T]he question is not whether infinite 
set theory, granted its conventions and axioms, constitutes an 
internally logically consistent system. The issue is whether such a  
system can be instantiated in the real world. ... Mackie has said 
nothing to resolve the absurdities or to commend to our thinking the 
real existence of an actual infinite." (pp.370-371) Moreover, Craig 
offers what seems to be intended to be an independent justification of 
the position which is adopted by the proponent of the Kalām argument: 
"The proponent of the Kalām argument ... may grant ... the practice of 
adopting the principle of correspondence as a convention in infinite 
set theory in preference to Euclid's principle, but he reminds us that 
this carries with it no ontological commitment concerning the real 
world. In the real world the absurdities in question do not arise 
because no actual infinite exists. Only finite collections actually 
exist, and therefore both Euclid's principle and Cantor's principle 
hold of them." (p.371) 
 
In response to Mackie's objection to the second sub-argument, Craig 
claims that the proponent of the Kalām argument does not have a 
prejudice against the actual infinite; rather, the proponent of the 
Kalām argument rejects the idea that an actual infinite can be formed 
by successive addition (i.e. that it can be "traversed"). Moreover, 
Craig claims that Mackie is mistaken to suppose that the proponent of 
the Kalām argument rejects the idea that an actual infinite can be 
formed by successive addition because s/he (i.e. the proponent of the 
Kalām argument) supposes that such a "traversal" would require an 
infinitely distant starting point; rather, Craig suggests, it is the 
very "beginningless character" of an infinite temporal series which 
serves to underscore the difficulty of the formation of such a series 
by successive addition. "It is not the proponent of the Kalām argument 
who fails to take infinitely seriously. He is all too aware that the 
order type of the series in question would be w*, the order type of 
the negative numbers. For the past to have been formed by successive 
addition, to have been "traversed", would be equivalent to saying 
someone has just succeeded in enumerating all the negative numbers 
ending at 0. But this seems to be inconceivable; as G.J. Whitrow 
urges: ' ... Since the set of order type w* is non-constructible, 
there is no reason for assuming it could represent an infinite series 
of past events.'" (pp.369-370) 
 
Furthermore, Craig also objects that it is simply irrelevant to note 
that, from any specific moment in past time there is only a finite 
stretch to the present. "The defender of the Kalām argument may grant 
the point with equanimity. The issue is how the whole series can be 
traversed or formed by successive addition, not a finite segment of 
it. Does Mackie think because every finite segment of the series can 
be so formed or traversed that the whole can? That would be to commit 
the fallacy of composition." (p.370) 
 
In response to Mackie's objection to 1., Craig objects that all that 
Mackie has done is to demand to be given a good a priori reason to 
accept 1. "What the defender of the Kalām argument maintains is that 
it is really impossible for something to come from nothing. But how 
can this be shown? I think that one could produce arguments for the 
principle, but that since that principle is so intuitively obvious in 
itself, it would be perhaps unwise to do so, for one ought not to try 
to prove the obvious via the less obvious. After all, does anyone 
sincerely think that things can pop into existence uncaused out of 
nothing?" (pp.371-372) 
 
Furthermore, in response to Mackie's claim that the intuitions which 
are needed to support 1. and 2. may not be available to the theist, 
Craig replies that what the theist will want to insist is that God's 
existence is not temporal. "[The theist holds] that God without 
creation exists changelessly and timelessly with an eternal 
determination for the creation of a temporal world and that with 
creation God enters into temporal relationships with the universe, 
time arising concomitantly with the first event. This may be 
mysterious ... but it is not so far as I can see unintelligible, as is 
something's coming into being uncaused out of nothing." (p.373) 
 
Next, in response to Mackie's claim that the theistic notion of the 
"self-explanatory" nature of God in indefensible, Craig replies that 
Mackie is here confounding the Kalām cosmological argument with the 
Leibnizian cosmological argument. "[The Kalām cosmological] argument 
only commits one to the necessity of God as an eternal and uncaused 
being, properties that characterise what philosophers for the last 20 
years have been calling a "factually necessary" being. Mackie can 
hardly object to the intelligibility of this sort of necessary being, 
since it is precisely what he as an atheist thinks the universe could 
be." (p.374) 
 
Finally, in response to Mackie's claim that we need not suppose that 
the current standard physical model of the universe requires creation 
ex nihilo, Craig objects that the Big Bang model does actually require 
creation ex nihilo. "The further one regresses in time, the denser the 
universe becomes until one finally reaches a point at which the 
universe was contracted down to a single mathematical point, from 
which the universe began to expand. But a point of infinite density is 
synonymous with "nothing". There can be no object in the real world 
which possesses infinite density, for if it had any extension 
whatsoever it could be even more dense. ... In [the models which 
Mackie is canvassing], the universe would have to pass through a 
singularity with each oscillation, then with every contraction, the 
universe would have to disappear into non-being and with each 
expansion emerge de novo from nothing. It is difficult to see what has 






Craig's reply to Mackie's criticism of the first sub-argument for 2. 
is rather puzzling. He concedes that infinite set theory is a 
logically consistent system; consequently, it seems that he concedes 
that there are logically possible worlds in which various "infinites" 
obtain.  However, he then insists that the important question is 
whether such infinites "can be instantiated or obtain in the real 
world" (my emphasis). But how is this question to be understood? 
 
One suggestion is that the question is whether there are any infinites 
in the actual world. Another suggestion is that the question is 
whether it is possible for there to be any infinites in the actual 
world. And a third suggestion is that the question is whether it is 
possible for there to be any infinites in any world. 
 
We can dismiss the third suggestion immediately; for Craig has already 
conceded that there are worlds in which there are infinites. Moreover, 
we can also dismiss the first suggestion -- for Craig offers us no 
defence of this claim. (He does tell us that the proponent of the 
Kalām argument is committed to the claim that there are no infinites 
in the actual world; however -- at this point in his paper -- he 
provides no further evidence for the truth of the claim that there are 
no infinites in the actual world beyond the thought that it would be 
absurd to suppose otherwise. Since Mackie does not share this 
intuition, this consideration cannot be decisive; at best, we have a 
stalemate.) 
 
What about the second suggestion? Well, in order to distinguish this 
claim from the third suggestion, it seems that we shall need to 
interpret it to be asking whether the existence of infinites is 
compatible with the actual laws of physics (or, more generally, the 
actual laws of nature). However, in this case, the argument ceases to 
be an a priori argument -- for it is clearly an a posteriori question 
what are the actual laws of nature. Moreover, since we don't yet know 
what are the laws of nature, we are not very well placed to make a 
judgement on this question. (Perhaps, on the basis of our current 
knowledge of the actual laws of nature, we can judge that it is fairly 
likely that there are no actual infinites; however, it is hard to see 
that we have much reason to be very confident about this. I shall 
return to this issue later.) 
 
In sum, then: Mackie's reply to the first sub-argument for 2. is 
decisive if this sub-argument is meant to be based on a priori 
considerations; for Cantorian set theory shows that it is possible for 
there to be worlds in which there are infinites. Consequently, the 
only way that this sub-argument can be defended in on a posteriori 
grounds. 
 
Craig's reply to Mackie's criticisms of the second sub-argument for 2. 
is more interesting. The core of this reply is the idea that actual 
infinites could not be "traversed" (i.e. could not be formed by 
successive addition).  
 
A first suggestion which one is inclined to make is that it all 
depends upon the nature of the infinite in question. Prima facie, it 
does seem that a collection of order type w* could not be traversed 
(because it has no starting point). However, there are infinite 
collections of different orders: consider, for instance, the 
collection which we might represent by 1, 2, 3,  ... ... 3, 2, 1. 
Consequently, it seems that there are infinites which can be traversed 
-- and hence it seems that the second sub-argument is unsound. 
 
However, this can't be the end of the matter -- for, of course, this 
new infinite collection has a starting point. If we were to rely on 
this response to Craig, then we would be conceding that -- whether or 
not it is infinite -- time must have an initial instant; and this, 
after all, is what the proponent of the Kalām cosmological argument 
really wants to establish. 
 
But let's look at Craig's initial objection again. What he says is 
that it is a legitimate objection to infinites which have no first 
member that they cannot be traversed. But what does this mean? Well, 
as far as I can see, it means that it is a legitimate objection to 
infinites which have no first member that they have no first member! 
(As his subsequent discussion reveals, the intuition which grounds the 
claim that the infinites in question cannot be traversed is that there 
is no beginning for such infinites.) 
 
But, as Mackie said originally, this is just the expression of a 
prejudice, against certain sorts of infinites, which relies on the 
unsupported assumption that any temporal sequence must have a first 
member. (Craig claims that Mackie's objection is that the proponent of 
the Kalām argument assumes that an infinite temporal sequence must 
have an infinitely distant starting point -- and Craig then remarks: 
"I know of no proponent of the Kalām argument who made such an 
assumption; on the contrary, the beginningless character of an 
infinite temporal series serves only to underscore the difficulty of 
its formation by successive addition." (p.369) But, of course, 
Mackie's point is not that there are proponents of the Kalām argument 
who explicitly assumed that an infinite temporal sequence must have an 
infinitely distant starting point; rather, Mackie's point is that all 
proponents of the Kalām argument implicitly suppose that every 
("real") temporal sequence must have a starting point. Moreover, 
Craig's own remarks about "the beginningless character of an infinite 
temporal series" serves to show that he himself makes this same 
implicit assumption.) 
 
In sum: As Mackie originally claimed, the second sub-argument for 2. 
merely expresses a prejudice against "actual" infinites. Once we grant 
-- as Craig does -- that Cantorian set theory reveals that worlds with 
actual infinites are logically possible, there can be no good a priori 
argument against actual infinite temporal sequences. (It should be 
noted -- contrary to Craig's last claim about this sub-argument -- 
that Mackie's point that, from any specific moment in past time, there 
is only a finite stretch to the present is relevant in the case of 
those sequences which have this property. For Mackie's point reveals 
that the whole series is formed by successive addition --  in the 
sense that, for each point in the series, there is an earlier one from 
which it derives by addition. To suppose that there is some further 
sense in which the series is not formed by successive addition is 
simply to express a prejudice against the claim that there might be 
such sequences.) 
 
Craig's main reply to Mackie's criticisms of the use which the Kalām 
cosmological argument makes of 1. is very weak. Essentially, Mackie's 
view is that, given the standard test for judgements of possibility 
(viz. conceivability in which there is no appearance of logical 
inconsistency), we have good reason to suppose that it is possible for 
something to begin to exist uncaused. If the proponent of the Kalām 
cosmological argument wishes to deny that it is possible for something 
to begin to exist uncaused, then s/he needs to provide some argument 
which shows that there is a logical inconsistency in this claim. But 
all that Craig says is that he thinks that it is possible that one 
could produce arguments which would establish this claim. This is all 
very well; however, those of us who are sympathetic to the thought 
that it is possible for something to begin to exist uncaused would 
like to see such an argument in order to judge for ourselves. 
 
(Craig does mention, in a footnote, an argument which he attributes to 
Jonathon Edwards: "Something cannot come into existence uncaused 
because it then becomes inexplicable why just any and everything 
cannot or does not come into existence uncaused. It cannot be said 
that only things of a certain nature come into existence uncaused 
because prior to their existence they have no nature which would 
control their coming to be." There are two distinct arguments here. 
The one which claims that it becomes inexplicable why just any and 
everything does not come into existence uncaused need not detain us; 
the obvious answer is that some things are brought into existence by 
things which already exist (e.g. children are brought into existence 
by their parents). However, the argument which claims it becomes 
inexplicable why just any and everything cannot come into existence 
uncaused is more interesting. I would -- for the same sorts of reasons 
which sustained Mackie's original argument -- suggest that, in fact, 
just any and everything can come into existence uncaused. However, I 
would also add that there seems to be good reason to believe that our 
universe is governed by certain conservation laws which ensure that 
such things do not actually happen.) 
 
Craig's further reply to Mackie's claim that the proponent of the 
Kalām cosmological argument is not entitled to the intuitions which 
are needed to support both 1. and 2. is rather puzzling. What Craig 
claims is that the theist will want to insist that God's existence is 
not temporal. But, as Mackie originally asserted, this claim is very 
hard to understand. Craig tells us that "God without creation exists 
changelessly and timelessly with an eternal determination for the 
creation of a temporal world and that with creation God enters into 
temporal relationships with the universe, time arising concomitantly 
with the first event". But I find that the meaning of this completely 
escapes me. How does God's existing "changelessly and timelessly" 
differ from his coming into existence uncaused at the very moment at 
which time is created? In the absence of further explanation (which I 
very much doubt can be provided), it seems to me that there is good 
reason to suppose that Mackie's initial charge is sustained. 
 
More importantly, there is a question about the ground of Craig's 
claim that it is intelligible to suppose that God exists "changelessly 
and timelessly". Does he suppose that here it is good enough to resort 
to the criterion of conceivability? But if so, why is it good enough 
here, and yet not in the case of the supposition that some things 
might exist uncaused? (At best, all we have are intuitions which it is 
common knowledge are not shared by both parties to the dispute. So 
further insistence on there intuitions can hardly advance the 
argument.) 
 
Finally, Craig's objection based on the claim that Mackie confounds 
the Kalām cosmological argument with the Leibnizian cosmological 
argument can also be seen to be misguided. Craig tells us that the 
Kalām cosmological argument is only committed to "the necessity of God 
as an eternal and uncaused being". But, if this "necessity" is not the 
(allegedly) unintelligible notion which is required by the Leibnizian 
cosmological argument, then it seems to me that one is entitled to 
suggest that perhaps the universe itself is "an eternal and uncaused 
being". I do not see how there can be a principled way of allowing 
that God has this property and yet the universe cannot have it. ("The 
universe exists changelessly and timelessly with an eternal 
determination to become a temporal world."  Sounds fine to me!) 
 
In sum, then: It seems to me that Mackie's original objections to 1. 
and 2. still stand. There is nothing that Craig says which restores 
any confidence which we may have in the Kalām cosmological argument, 
if that argument is intended to be purely a priori. Moreover, it is 
hard to see that there could be any a posteriori evidence which could 
support 1. -- i.e. it seems that the argument cannot be restored as an 
a posteriori argument. However, there is one point about the a 
posteriori evidence for 2. which still needs to be discussed. 
 
As I noted earlier, Craig claims that the Big Bang model does actually 
require creation ex nihilo. However, his argument relies on the 
assumption that  a point of infinite density is synonymous with 
"nothing". But what reason is there to assent to this claim? After 
all, it seems clear that a point of infinite density has various 
properties (e.g. possession of infinite density) which would not be 
instantiated in a world in which there was nothing at all! 
 
Now, perhaps this is a misunderstanding of what Craig means -- for he 
goes on to say that there can be no object in the real world which 
possesses infinite density, since if it had any extension whatsoever 
it could be even more dense. But this argument is just based on his 
original prejudice against actual infinites. For, of course, if an 
extended entity which was infinitely dense doubled in volume, it would 
have exactly the same density as it had to begin with. No problem. 
 
Consequently, it just doesn't follow that, in the models which Mackie 
canvasses, with every contraction the universe would have to disappear 
into non-being and with each expansion emerge de novo from nothing. 
Rather, on Mackie's models, the universe would shrink to a point of 
infinite density, and then expand from that point again. However, 
whether these models are physically plausible is not a question on 
which I am competent to judge. 
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